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corporate reorganization that splits off corporate assets (and
shareholders) into a newly formed corporation.23  That
procedure is discussed in the July, 1991, issue of
Agricultural Law Digest.24
FOOTNOTES
1 Pub. L. 99-514, § 631, 100 Stat. 2269 (1986), amending I.R.C.
§ 336.
2 Pub. L. 99-514, § 633(d)(1), 100 Stat. 2278 (1986).
3 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 59.03[3] (1993);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 7.02[6] (1993).
4 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).  See Harl, supra n. 1, § 59.07[2] (1993).
5 Pub. L. 99-514, § 631(a), 100 Stat. 2269 (1986), amending
I.R.C. § 336.  See Ltr. Rul. 9146001, July 28, 1991 (amount of
gain determined using fair market value, not special use value
used previously in deceased shareholder's estate).
6 H. Rep. No. 99-426 at 283 (1986).
7 I.R.C. § 1239(a).
8 I.R.C. §§ 336(d)(1)(A), 267(b).
9 I.R.C. § 336(d)(1)(B).
10 Id.
11 See Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(b).
12 I.R.C. § 1001(b).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c).
14 See I.R.C. § 1374.
15 I.R.C. § 1374(d)(3).
16 I.R.C. § 11(b)(1).
17 I.R.C.  § 1374(b)(1).
18 Ann. 86-128, I.R.B. 1986-51.
19 Pub. L. 99-514, § 633(b), 100 Stat. 2277 (1986).
20 H. Rep. No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-203 (1986).
21 Rev. Rul. 86-141, 1986-2 C.B. 151.
22 I.R.C. § 331(a).  See ns. 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
23 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
24 N. Harl, "Divisive Corporate Reorganizations," 2 Agric. L.
Dig. 121 (1991). Editor’s note: Reprints of the 1991 article
may be ordered for $3.00 from Editor, Agricultural Law Press,
P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI 53705.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
ESTATE PROPERTY-ALM § 13.03[3].* In 1990 and
1991, the debtor suffered crop losses from natural disasters
and in December 1991, federal disaster payments for 1990
and 1991 crops were authorized by Congress. The debtor
filed for Chapter 7 in January 1992 and received crop
disaster benefits in April 1992. The debtor argued that the
benefits were post-petition payments excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. The court held that the disaster benefits
were the proceeds of crops which would have been estate
property but for the disasters; therefore, the disaster benefits
were estate property. In re Ring, 160 B.R. 692 (M.D. Ga.
1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
HOMESTEAD. The debtors were allowed to include in
their homestead a vacant lot across the street from their
residence which was used for parking, a garden and storage.
In re Flatt, 160 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1993).
IRA. The debtor was allowed an exemption for $9,000
in an IRA as reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support
because the debtor was in school and had no other source of
retirement funds. In re Baumgardner, 160 B.R. 572
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
PERSONAL PROPERTY. The debtors claimed an
exemption for the $77,000 cash value of a life insurance
policy under Tex. Prop. Code § 42.002(a)(2) and $57,000 in
personal property under Tex. Prop. Code § 42.001. The
trustee argued and the court held that the cash value of the
life insurance policy was allowed as an exemption but that
exemption exhausted the debtors’ personal property
exemptions which were limited to $60,000; therefore, no
exemption was allowed for the other personal property. In
re Bowes, 160 B.R. 290 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
POST-PETITION PROPERTY. Within 180 days after
filing a Chapter 7 petition, the debtor inherited property
from a decedent. The debtor filed amended exemption
schedules claiming a portion of the inherited property as
exempt. The trustee argued that the debtor could only claim
exemptions for property owned by the debtor on the date of
the petition. The court held that the debtor could claim an
exemption for property which became estate property after
the filing of the petition. In re Magness, 160 B.R. 294
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. An involuntary
petition was filed against the debtor in September 1988 and
the debtor’s taxable year ended on December 31, 1988. The
IRS filed an untimely claim for the 1988 taxes and sought
administrative expense priority for the claim, arguing that
because the taxes became due post-petition, the taxes were
incurred by the bankruptcy estate. The court held that
because all of the taxable income was received by the debtor
pre-petition, the taxes were incurred by the debtor and not
the estate. In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 160 B.R.
136 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors sought to avoid pre-
petition state and federal tax liens under Section 545(1)(D)
as filed when the debtor was insolvent. The court held that
the Section 545(1)(D) avoidance can occur only when a lien
arose because of the debtor’s insolvency; therefore, Section
545(1)(D) did not apply in this case because the liens were
filed independent of the debtor’s insolvency. In re
Swafford, 160 B.R. 246 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
CLAIMS. The Chapter 13 debtors had obtained
confirmation of their plan in September 1991. The debtors
filed a return for a prepetition tax year in 1992 and the IRS
filed a claim in the case in 1993. The trustee moved to
disallow the claim as untimely filed. The IRS argued that
because the debtors’ plan provided for payment of all
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priority claims, the IRS claim had to be included in the plan,
whether timely filed or not. The court held that timeliness of
filing is a prerequisite to allowance of priority claims but the
court allowed further proceedings on whether the IRS claim
should be allowed on equitable grounds. Matter of Keck,
160 B.R. 113 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993).
The IRS was allowed to file a priority tax claim 35 days
after the claims bar date where (1) the claim was filed
before any distributions by the trustee and before the close
of the estate, (2) no indicia of bad faith was found on the
part of the creditor, and (3) allowance of the claim would
not prejudice other creditors. Matter of Brenner, 160 B.R.
302 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
The debtor had listed a claim for federal taxes in the
Chapter 13 case but the IRS did not file a claim until five
months after the claims bar date. The debtor sought to avoid
the claim to the extent it exceeded the debtor’s listed claim.
The IRS received notice of the case and did not give any
excuse for the delay but argued that its claim was allowable
as an amendment to the debtor’s listed claim. The court held
that the IRS claim was disallowed to the extent it exceeded
the debtor’s original claim. In re Stoiber, 160 B.R. 307
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
CONFIRMATION. The IRS had filed secured, priority
and unsecured claims in the debtor’s case. The court had
ordered objections to the plan to be filed within three
business days before the confirmation hearing. The IRS
failed to file an objection before the hearing but the IRS
filed an objection within three days before a second hearing
after the first hearing was continued. The court held that the
objection would be considered because the debtor had
sufficient notice and opportunity for responding to the
objection. In re Ryan, 160 B.R. 494 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y.
1993).
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* The debtors had failed
to timely file federal income tax returns due more than three
years before the filing of their bankruptcy petition. The IRS
had assessed tax deficiencies, negligence penalties and
interest for these tax years. The court held that the interest
and penalties were all dischargeable because the returns to
which the assessments applied were due more than three
years before the petition. The court reversed the Bankruptcy
Court ruling that the taxes were dischargeable, holding that
the wrong standard for “willful” evasion of taxes was
applied. The court held that “willful” involved only an
intentional and knowing attempt to evade or defeat taxes. In
re Hedgecock, 160 B.R. 380 (D. Or. 1993).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. In February 1993,
the IRS levied the debtor’s employer for commissions
earned by the debtor. The debtor filed for Chapter 13. The
employer paid the February 1993 commission to the IRS
post-petition and the debtor sought turnover of the money
paid. The court held that the February levy divested the
debtor of any interest in the February commission such that
the commission was not estate property subject to turnover.
In re Eisenbarger, 160 B.R. 542 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
PRIORITY CLAIMS. The IRS had filed claims for
taxes and civil fraud penalties against the Chapter 13 debtor
and the debtor objected to the claims in substance and as
priority claims. The debtor argued that taxes based on
fraudulent returns or willful evasion of taxes are not entitled
to priority under Sections 523(a)(1)(C) and
507(A)(7)(A)(iii) and are eligible for discharge under
Section 1328(a)(2). The court agreed, noting that only
Chapter 13 contains no exception to discharge for tax claims
based on fraud. The IRS argued that the debtor should be
barred from using Chapter 13 because the attempt to
discharge the tax fraud claims indicated a bad faith filing.
The court held that the debtor’s use of valid Chapter 13
provisions to discharge civil tax fraud penalty claims was
not bad faith. Matter of Verdunn, 160 B.R. 682 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1993).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.  The debtor was president
and sole shareholder in a corporation which failed to make
payments of withholding taxes.  The debtor claimed to have
been unaware of the failure to make the payments and took
steps to pay the deficiency as soon as the debtor was aware
of it.  The court held that the debtor was a "responsible
person" although payment of the withholding taxes was
delegated to other employees and the failure to make the
payments was willful in that the debtor continued to make
payment of net wages to employees after the debtor was
notified of the deficiency.  In re Vaglica, 160 B.R. 557
(E.D. Tex. 1993), aff’g, 112 B.R. 17 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1990).
TAX LIENS. The IRS had filed claims for pre-petition
taxes owed by the debtor and the claims were determined to
be secured claims, unsecured priority claims, and general
unsecured claims. The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan was
confirmed and after the debtor paid the amount of the
secured claim, the debtor sought release of the tax lien. The
IRS argued that the lien had to remain effective until all its
claims were paid in order to protect its priority status. The
court held that, under Section 506(d), the tax lien became
void after payment of the underlying obligation. In re
Campbell, 160 B.R. 198 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
CONTRACTS
GOOD FAITH. The plaintiff potato grower granted the
defendant a right of first refusal to purchase potatoes after
harvest. The plaintiff received an offer from a third party but
refused the offer. The third party refused to make a further
offer until the defendant waived its right of first refusal,
which the defendant refused to do. The negotiations fell
through and the plaintiff sought recovery from the defendant
for the loss of purchase price, claiming that the defendant
breached the duty of good faith dealing in refusing to waive
the right of first refusal during the negotiations. The court
held that the defendant did not breach the duty of good faith
dealing because the first refusal option did not require a
waiver until another offer had been made and no offer
existed when the defendant was asked to waive the option.
The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant intentionally
interfered with the plaintiff's business in refusing to waive
the option during the negotiations in that the defendant had
not required a firm offer in dealings with other potato
growers. The court held that the plaintiff had raised
sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for summary
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judgment. Aylett v. Universal Frozen Foods Co., 861 P.2d
375 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
COOPERATIVES
DISSENTER’S RIGHTS. The plaintiff was an
agricultural cooperative which decided to merge with
another cooperative. The defendant was a member of the
plaintiff and held a voting common share in the plaintiff as
well as nonvoting preferred shares and a share in the
patrons’ equity reserve and general reserve. The plaintiff
held a vote on the merger and the defendant voted against
the merger and sought payment for its entire interest in the
plaintiff under Ind. Code § 15-7-1-28. The court held that
the defendant was not entitled to payment of its interest in
the plaintiff because the plaintiff was not required to have a
shareholder’s vote for the merger. In addition, the court held
that the defendant was not entitled to payment for the
preferred shares or the patron’s equity and general reserves
because those interests were not voting interests. Indiana




BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
defendant had borrowed money from the plaintiff and had
granted to the plaintiff a security interest in the defendant’s
farm. After the defendant’s default on the loan, the plaintiff
sought foreclosure. One of the defendant’s defenses was that
the plaintiff failed to comply with the Agricultural Credit
Act. The court held that the defendant could raise the
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Act as an equitable
defense to a foreclosure action. Western Farm Credit
Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations adding Kansas to the list of validated
brucellosis-free states. 58 Fed. Reg. 68505 (Dec. 28, 1993).
The APHIS has issued proposed regulations providing
for payment of indemnity to owners of destroyed
brucellosis-exposed cattle or bison where the cattle or bison
were acquired from a herd which, after the acquisition, was
discovered to be infected with brucellosis. 58 Fed. Reg.
68561 (Dec. 28, 1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FSIS has
issued interim regulations to add provisions to the hybrid
seed crop regulations for coverage of losses due to late and
prevented planting. 58 Fed. Reg. 67644 (Dec. 22, 1993).
The FSIS has issued interim regulations to add
provisions to the corn, grain sorghum, hybrid sorghum seed,
rice, cotton, barley, oats and wheat crop endorsements for
coverage of losses due to late and prevented planting. 58
Fed. Reg. 67630 (Dec. 22, 1993).
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY. The plaintiff was a
nursery which imported apple root stock fumigated by the
defendant fumigation company. The company was regulated
by the Plant Protection and Quarantine  Division (PPQ) and
fumigated the root stock under guidelines set forth in the
PPQ manual. The plaintiff and defendant alleged that the
PPQ was responsible for damages to the root stock for
failing to insure that the stock was fumigated properly. The
court held that the regulatory relationship between the PPQ
and the defendant did not give rise to a duty to insure the
proper fumigation of the plaintiff’s root stock. The court
also held that the PPQ was not liable for failing to properly
monitor the defendant’s operation because under
Washington's “public duty doctrine,” the PPQ did not
breach a duty to a specific person. Cameron v. Janssen
Bros. Nurseries, Ltd., 7 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ALTERNATE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* Two
forged deeds purporting to transfer real estate owned by the
decedent were dated May 6, 1986 but the deeds were not
recorded until two days after the decedent’s death. The
estate representative successfully voided the deeds in state
court. The estate elected to value the property on the
alternate valuation date and discounted the value of the
property by 70 percent because the recorded deeds created a
cloud on the title. The IRS ruled that the forged deeds did
not affect the valuation of the property for estate tax
purposes because the decedent’s total estate and gift tax
liability would be the same whether the deeds were valid or
invalid. Ltr. Rul. 9350004, June 8, 1993.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
taxpayers established an irrevocable charitable lead trust
which provided annual payments of $975,000 with authority
for the trustees to make additional payments if the excess
payments commuted future payments by the same amount.
The trust made several annual excess payments but did not
commute future payments by the excess amounts.  The court
held that the trust was not allowed a deduction for the
excess amounts because the amounts were not made
pursuant to the trust provisions.  Rebecca K. Crown
Income Charitable Fund v. Comm'r, 8 F.3 571 (7th Cir.
1993), aff’g, 98 T.C. 276 (1992).
DISCLAIMERS. A portion of the decedent’s estate
passed in trust to an heir. The trust provided that if the heir
disclaimed a portion of the trust, that portion passed to a
charitable foundation in which a child of the heir served as a
trustee.  The heir disclaimed in writing 80 percent of the
interest in the trust. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer was
effective and the child’s serving as trustee of the foundation
would not be considered as a power of the heir to direct the
transfer of the property. The IRS also ruled that the passing
of the disclaimed property to the charitable foundation
would be eligible for a charitable deduction to the
decedent’s estate. The decedent’s will also provided for an
increase in the property passing to the heir equal to the
estate tax benefit resulting from a disclaimer. The IRS ruled
that this provision was not in the nature of consideration for
the disclaimer. Ltr. Rul. 9350032, Sept. 22, 1993.
The decedent’s will bequeathed property in trust to the
surviving spouse and provided that if the spouse disclaimed
a portion of the bequest, that portion would pass to qualified
charitable foundations. The spouse served as a trustee and
president of the foundations but the foundations amended
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their bylaws to have the disclaimed funds managed by a
trustee committee which did not include the spouse. The
IRS ruled that the spouse’s disclaimer of a portion of the
bequest was a qualified disclaimer and that the property
passing to the charitable foundations would be eligible for
the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9350033, Sept. 22, 1993.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The decedent’s family corporation
had recapitalized the corporation’s stock, exchanging
common stock for preferred stock, with all additional
common stock transferred to the decedent’s son. The
preferred stock had time limited voting rights and a right to
receive noncumulative dividends at the discretion of the
board of directors. The preferred stock was also subject to a
stock restriction and repurchase agreement allowing the
corporation to redeem the stock at $105 a share. The court
held that no gift occurred in the recapitalization because the
value of the common stock transferred was not greater than
the value of the preferred stock received.  The court also
held that the failure of the corporation to pay dividends on
the preferred stock was not a gift because the decedent, as a
board member, was under a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the shareholders and the company needed extra
reserves in the difficult economic times being experienced.
Lewis G. Hutchens Non-Marital Trust v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-600.
LIFE INSURANCE. The decedent had owned 49.5
percent of the stock of a corporation and entered into a buy-
sell agreement under which a trust was created to purchase
life insurance on the life of the decedent to be used to at
least partially fund a redemption of the decedent’s shares on
the decedent’s death. The trustee was prohibited from
exercising any incidents of ownership over the insurance
policy and the decedent had the right to purchase the policy
at the cash surrender value. Because the life insurance was
term, the policy would have a zero cash value for several
years. The corporation paid for the policy with earnings
which otherwise would have accrued to the shareholders.
The decedent then entered into a redemption agreement
under which the decedent received $150,000 for a covenant
not to compete and a note for $300,000 payable over 30
months for the decedent’s stock. At the decedent’s death,
$92,000 remained to be paid on the note. The IRS ruled that
the life insurance policy was included in the decedent’s
gross estate because the decedent constructively retained the
incidents of ownership of the policy in that the trustee had
no independent power over the insurance policy. Ltr. Rul.
9349002, Aug. 25, 1993.
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The taxpayer owned,
with other family members, 45 percent of the stock of a
corporation which employed the taxpayer. The taxpayer and
corporation entered into a stock option plan which gave the
taxpayer the right for five years to purchase stock at 110
percent of the market price of the stock on the date an
option was granted. The taxpayer transferred the options to
an irrevocable trust for the taxpayer’s descendants. The IRS
ruled (1) the transfers of the options to the trusts were
completed gifts, (2) I.R.C. § 2701 does not apply to the
transfers because the options are not equity interests in the
corporation, (3) I.R.C. § 2703 does not apply to the transfers
because the transfers were arm’s length transfers for
adequate consideration, and (4) the options would not be
includible in the taxpayer’s gross estate because the trusts
were irrevocable. Ltr. Rul. 9350016, Sept. 16, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD-ALM § 4.01.* The IRS has
adopted as final regulations relating to the requesting of IRS
approval for a change in accounting method required by
I.R.C. § 448. The regulations also provide rules for
adjustment of taxable income under I.R.C. § 481(a) because
of the change in accounting method. 58 Fed. Reg. 68297
(Dec. 27, 1993).
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7].* The taxpayer was
employed as an executive in another business and loaned
money to the taxpayer’s family farming operation. The
taxpayer was not employed by the farming operation and
treated the involvement of money and time as retirement
planning. The court held that the taxpayer could claim only
a personal bad debt deduction for losses on the loan because
the loan was not made to protect the taxpayer’s employment
with the farm operation. Schmidt v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-506.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The IRS
has ruled that compensatory damages, including back pay,
awarded in an action for disparate impact gender
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
disparate impact racial discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1870 are excludible from gross income.  However,
awards of back pay alone are not excludible. Rev. Rul. 93-
88, I.R.B. 1993-41, 4.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The cash method taxpayers entered into an
agreement with the SBA to discharge a portion of their
indebtedness in exchange for cash payments. The payments
were made in December but the removal of the lien and
other ministerial actions were not completed until January.
The court held that the discharge of indebtedness income
from the transaction was recognized in the taxable year of
the payments because no further contingency remained for
cancellation of the debt. Rivera v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-609.
The IRS has issued temporary regulations relating to
information reporting requirements of financial entities
discharging $600 or more of indebtedness per year per
debtor. The temporary regulations provide that the date of
discharge for information reporting purposes occurs when
an identifiable event occurs after which the debt no long
need be paid. Such events include (1) a discharge in
bankruptcy, (2) an agreement between the lender and debtor
to discharge the debt, and (3) cancellation of the debt by
operation of law. However, the determination of the
identifiable event is to be made based on all the facts and
circumstances. 58 Fed. Reg. 68301 (Dec. 27, 1993).
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period January 1, 1994 through March 31, 1994, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 6 percent
and for underpayments remains at 7 percent. The interest
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rate for underpayments by large corporations remains at 9
percent. Rev. Rul. 93-94, I.R.B. 1993-42.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
CONTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations relating to the allocation of built-in gain or loss
in property to the partner who contributed the property. In
general, the regulations require the use of a reasonable
allocation method which takes into account the variation
between the adjusted tax basis of the property and its fair
market value. The new regulations provide three methods
considered reasonable but allows taxpayers to use another
method if under the facts and circumstances, the method is
reasonable. The regulations specifically define as
unreasonable an allocation method which increases or
decreases the property's basis or where the partnership
creates tax allocations of income, gain, loss or deduction
independent of allocations affecting book capital accounts.
58 Fed. Reg. 67676 (Dec. 22, 1993).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The IRS has
ruled that a business organized under the Arizona Limited
Liability Act could be taxed as a corporation or partnership,
but would be taxed as a partnership if (1) the articles of
organization restricted the transferability of interests and
required the dissolution of the company upon termination of
a member’s interest unless all members agree to continue
the company and (2) the articles of organization provided
for management by elected members of the organization.
Rev. Rul. 93-93, I.R.B. 1993-42, 13.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations amending the compensation limit for tax-
qualified retirement plans under I.R.C. § 401(a)(17). 58
Fed. Reg. 69302 (Dec. 30, 1993).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c]*
STOCK BASIS.  The IRS has adopted as final
regulations relating to adjustments to the basis of a
shareholder's stock in an S corporation and the basis of a
shareholder's indebtedness of an S corporation to a
shareholder.  The IRS also adopted as final regulations
relating to the treatment of distributions to S corporation
shareholders.
The basis of a shareholder's stock is increased, on a per
share-per day basis, by the shareholder's pro rata share of
(1) the corporation's separately stated items of income, (2)
the corporation’s nonseparately stated items of income, and
(3) the excess of the corporation's deductions for depletion
over the basis of the property subject to depletion.  Treas.
Reg. § 1.1367-1(b).
The basis of a shareholder's stock is decreased, on a per
share-per day basis (but not below zero) by (1) distributions
that are not includible in the shareholder's income under
Section 1368, (2) the shareholder's pro rata share of
corporation items of loss and any expense of the corporation
that is not deductible in computing its taxable income and
not chargeable to a capital account, and (3) deductions for
depletion to the extent that the deduction does not exceed
the basis of the property subject to depletion.  Treas. Reg. §
1.1367-1(c).
The  regulations require that, if for any taxable year the
shareholder's basis of an S corporation debt has been
decreased, any net increase in shareholder basis for any
subsequent taxable year must be used to restore the basis of
the debt, as existing on the first day of the subsequent
taxable year, before increasing the shareholder's basis in
stock.  If the shareholder holds more than one debt of the
corporation, the restoration of basis is to be first applied to
any debt which is repaid during the subsequent taxable year.
The remaining increase is to be allocated among the
remaining debts according to the amount of reduction in the
previous taxable year.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-2(c).
The  regulations provide that a distribution by an S
corporation without earnings and profits is not included in
the shareholder's gross income to the extent the distribution
does not exceed the adjusted basis of all the shareholder's
shares of stock.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(c). If the amount of
the distribution exceeds the adjusted basis of all of the
shareholder's stock, the excess is treated as gain from the
sale or exchange of property.
A distribution in excess of a corporation's accumulated
adjustments account (AAA) is not included in the gross
income of the shareholder to the extent the distribution is an
actual distribution of money and the portion in excess of the
AAA does not exceed the shareholder's net share of the
corporation's previously taxed income immediately before
the distribution.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(d).
The tax effect of a distribution to a shareholder is
determined only after taking into account the adjustments to
bases of the shareholder's stock under Section 1367 without
regard for the distributions made during the corporation's
taxable year.  The determination of the source of a
distribution is to be made only after the AAA has been
adjusted to reflect (1) increases for taxable income items
and the excess of the deductions for depletion, (2) decreases
for nondeductible noncapital expenses (excluding taxes
attributable to taxable years as a C corporation or to exempt
income), (3) decreases from oil and gas depletion
deductions, and (4) decreases for items of loss or deduction.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(e).
If a shareholder disposes of 20 percent or more of the
shareholder's stock in a 30-day period, the corporation may
elect to treat the taxable year as two taxable years, with the
first ending on the date the stock was transferred,  for
purposes of allocating items of income and loss, adjustments
to the AAA, basis and earnings and profits, and determining
the tax effect of distributions.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(g).
If the sum of all distributions, except distributions from
earnings and profits or PTI, during the taxable year exceed
the AAA at the close of the taxable year, the balance of the
AAA is allocated among the distributions in proportion to
the amount of each distribution.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-2(b).
59 Fed. Reg. 12 (Jan. 3, 1994).
TRUSTS. S corporation stock was held in several trusts.
The trusts provided for trustee discretion for treating
corporate distributions as income or principal but state law
required the proceeds of stock redemptions to be allocated
to trust principal. The S corporation redeemed some of its
stock for cash in an I.R.C. § 302(d) redemption. The IRS
ruled that the distributions to the trusts would not be income
to the trust beneficiaries; therefore, allocation of the
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distributions to trust principal would not disqualify the trusts
as QSST’s. Ltr. Rul. 9349009, Sept. 9, 1993.
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a self-
employed logger who also repaired equipment in a home
shop. The court held that the taxpayer could deduct the cost
of travel between the home and various logging sites
because the taxpayer regularly used the home for a business.
Walker v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 36 (1993).
NEGLIGENCE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The plaintiff granted
the defendant permission to graze cattle on the plaintiff’s
land and to intermingle those cattle with the plaintiff’s
cattle. On April 10, 1992, the plaintiff filed suit against the
defendant for damage to the plaintiff’s cattle from an
infection of trichomoniasis from the defendant’s cattle. The
defendant argued that the action was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations of Mont. Code § 27-2-207 for action
for injury to personal property. The court held that the three-
year statute of limitation of Mont. Code § 27-2-204 for tort
actions applied because where the two statutes conflict the
longer limitation period is to be used. Ritland v. Rowe, 861
P.2d 175 (Mont. 1993).
SPREAD OF WEEDS. The defendant enrolled fields in
the Conservation Reserve Program which were adjacent to
the plaintiffs’ farm. After kochia and Russian thistle grew
on the CRP acres, the defendant combined the area as a
weed control method. The plaintiffs sued for damages to
their property from the spread of the cut weeds. The trial
court had granted the defendant summary judgment, holding
that the defendant had no duty to the plaintiff in the control
of weeds. The appellate court reversed, holding that when
the defendant attempted to control the spread of weeds, the
defendant owed the plaintiffs the duty to use ordinary care
to prevent the spread of the weeds to the plaintiffs’ property
and the plaintiffs had raised sufficient facts to place at issue
the question of whether the defendant used a reasonable
method of weed control in respect to that duty. Kukowski v.
Simonson Farm, Inc., 507 N.W.2d 68 (N.D. 1993).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CATTLE FEED. The plaintiffs were diary farmers who
fed their cows feed manufactured by the defendant. The
plaintiffs claimed that the feed was contaminated by the
pesticide Aldrin, causing illness and poor milk production in
their cows. The plaintiffs sued the defendant in strict
liability and the defendant argued that strict liability was not
applicable because no harm to humans was alleged, only
economic damages was claimed and the damage was not
sudden or major. The court held that (1) an action for strict
liability may be allowed where the only injury was to
personal property, (2) the plaintiffs’ claim included loss of
property in that the plaintiff claimed that the cows had
become valueless, and (3) the action in strict liability was
barred because the damages did not occur suddenly but
progressed over five years. Reed v. Central Soya Co., Inc.,
621 N.E.2d 1069 (Ind. 1993).
SEEDS. The plaintiff purchased watermelon seeds from
separate defendants. The seeds grew well enough until the
plants developed a blotch which eventually destroyed most
of the crop. The plaintiff alleged that the seed was produced
on infected fields and sued for breach of implied and
express warranties, strict liability and negligence. The lower
appellate court ruled that the first defendant was not liable
for breach of express warranty in that the seed containers
only promised that the seed would have "high vitality, vigor
and germination," all of which were met. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a fact issue was raised as to
whether the blotch affected the seed vitality. Both appellate
courts ruled that no issue of fact remained as to the other
defendant for breach of express warranty in that the seed
order promised that the seeds were “strictly high grade
seeds,” because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence to
support a definition of “high grade.”  The appellate court
held that an issue of fact was raised as to whether the terms
“properly fitted for seeding purposes” meant only that the
seeds were warranted to be watermelon seeds and not that
the seeds were free of disease. The first defendant was held
to have effectively disclaimed any implied warranties
through conspicuous placement on the seed containers of a
specific disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability
or of fitness for a particular purpose. The Supreme Court
held that an issue of fact remained as to whether the second
defendant was relieved of any implied warranties because of
an established industry practice to limit liability to the cost
of the seeds.  The Supreme Court allowed summary
judgment for the defendants on the strict liability claim
because the disease did not cause “sudden” damages and the
action was one in warranty. Summary judgment for the
defendants was allowed as to the negligence claim because
the plaintiff sought only economic damages. Martin
Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078
(Ind. 1993), rev’g in part and aff’g in part, 601 N.E.2d 429
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DESCRIPTION OF COLATERAL. The defendants,
father and son, borrowed money from the plaintiff and
granted the plaintiff a security interest in “All swine now
owned or hereafter acquired” by the defendants with the
swine to be kept on the son’s farm. The defendants sought
to avoid the plaintiff’s foreclosure action by claiming that
the swine owned by the father were not included in the
collateral. The court held that because both defendants
signed the loan and security papers, the all inclusive
description of the collateral applied to swine owned by both
defendants. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff’s
repossession of the proceeds of a sale of the swine was a
wrongful intentional interference with business relations.
The court held that no wrongful interference can occur
where the plaintiff is enforcing a valid security interest.
Driggers v. Continental Grain Co., 435 S.E.2d 722 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Peterson, 160 B.R. 385 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1993),
on rem. from, 152 B.R. 329 (D. Wyo. 1993), rev’g, 132
B.R. 68 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1991) (bankruptcy discharge), see
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